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Abstract
In this paper I examine the uneasy intersection between ‘religion’, ‘gender’ and 
‘postcoloniality’ as it is staged in the sub-field of religion and gender within religious 
studies and theology. Noting the lack of sustained attention in this field to those 
postcolonial challenges that might question the prioritization of gender as the site 
from which critique should be originated, and suggesting that this neglect might 
compromise the assumption that, because of its alignment with the politics of the 
marginal, it is comparatively less implicated in colonial knowledge formations, I 
argue that scholars of religion and gender risk perpetuating imperialist figurations 
found elsewhere in the academic study of religions. I propose the figure of the 
catachresis, as theorized by Gayatri Spivak, as a potential step towards displacing 
those European concept-metaphors and value-codings that both derive from 
imperialist ideologies and sustain the fiction operational within much, though 
not all, religion and gender scholarship of a generalizable or normative epistemic 
subjectivity. I suggest these ideologies ultimately prevent an encounter with the 
women and men who exist beyond this mode of production and whose priorities 
may be configured entirely differently to those that seem currently to inform and 
produce the intellectual itineraries of the field.
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of intellectual history, narrativity, feminist and postcolonial criticism, and epis-
temological modelling in the study of religions.
Introduction
Within the academic field of the study of religions, the intimate bonds between 
Western scholarship, European colonialism, and the discursive production and 
employment of ‘religion’ have been well rehearsed.1 Within feminist and gen-
der studies, there has also been a longstanding, alternately fruitful and vexed 
set of exchanges between feminist, gender-critical, and postcolonial bodies of 
theory.2 It is thus both curious and troubling that there has been comparatively 
little engagement in the sub-field of ‘religion and gender’ (operating predom-
inantly within the fields of religious studies and theology)3 with postcolonial 
thought, particularly with respect to examining the potential intersections or 
disjunctures between the field’s eponymous objects of study and the constel-
lation of concepts marked as and by ‘postcoloniality’. Even a cursory review of 
literature in the field in the last decade reveals a startling absence of sustained 
or fully systematic reflection on the ways in which the basic operational assump-
tions, premises, idioms and enunciatory locations of the field might require 
1 See, for example, T. Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power 
in Christianity and Islam, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1993; D. Chidester, 
Savage Systems: Colonialism and Comparative Religion in Southern Africa, Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia 1996; D. Chidester, ‘Real and Imagined: Imperial Inventions 
of Religion in Colonial Southern Africa’ in T. Fitzgerald (ed.), Religion and the Secular: 
Historical and Colonial Formations, London: Equinox 2007, 153–176; T. Fitzgerald, 
The Ideology of Religious Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000; T. Fitzgerald, 
Discourse on Civility and Barbarity: A Critical History of Religion and Related Categories, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007; R. King, Orientalism and Religion, London and 
New York: Routledge 1999; R.T. McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1997; R.T. McCutcheon, ‘The Imperial Dynamic in the Study of Religion’ 
in C.R. King (ed.), Postcolonial America, Urbana: University of Illinois Press 2000, 275–302.
2 The literature in this respect is vast. For a representative sample see G. Anzaldúa, 
Borderlands: The New Mestiza=La Frontera, San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books 1987; 
R. Chow, ‘“It’s You and Not Me”: Dominations and “Othering” in Theorizing the 
“Third World”’ in E. Weed (ed.), Coming to Terms: Feminism, Theory, Politics, New York 
and London: Routledge 1989, 152–161; T.T. Minh-ha, Woman, Native, Other: Writing 
Postcoloniality and Feminism, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1989; C.T. Mohanty, 
‘Under Western Eyes’ in C.T. Mohanty, A. Russo and L. Torres (eds.), Third World Women 
and the Politics of Feminism, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 
1991, 51–79; C. Moraga and G. Anzaldúa (eds.), This Bridge Called my Back: Writings 
by Radical Women of Colour. Watertown, MA: Persephone Press 1983; U. Narayan, 
Dislocating Cultures. Identities, Traditions, and Third-World Feminism, New York and 
London: Routledge 1997; R.S. Rajan, Real and Imagined Women: Gender, Culture and 
Postcolonialism, London: Routledge 1993.
3 I will clarify below in more detail and precision what I intend by the phrase ‘field 
of religion and gender’, but in the interim it should suffice to say that I am broadly 
addressing, though not necessarily confining myself to religion and gender scholarship 
within the intellectual environment – I hesitate to refer to it as a ‘discipline’ – in which I 
am embedded and to which I am most committed, namely the academic study of religions.
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reformulation, revision, or even rejection in light of the compelling epistemo-
logical and ontological challenges posed by a variety of postcolonialisms. Durre 
Ahmed’s volume Gendering the Spirit: Women, Religion, and the Post-Colonial 
Response (2001), Kwok Pui-Lan and Laura Donaldson’s collection of essays Post-
colonialism, Feminism and Religious Discourse (2002), and Ursula King and Tina 
Beattie’s edited volume Gender, Religion and Diversity: Cross-Cultural Perspec-
tives (2004) are virtually lone voices in what appears increasingly to be the wil-
derness of feminist and gender-critical engagements with religion inasmuch as 
these have failed to confront their parochial, possibly violent appropriations 
of ‘the other’ ‘over there’. Even as I invoke the Judaeo-Christian metaphor of 
a voice in the wilderness redolent with its soteriological call, I must admit the 
invisible force of my own Christian background, daughter of missionaries in 
India, which bequeaths me a vocabulary that carries a weight of colonial his-
tory. Indeed, Laura Donaldson reminds us of the ‘crucial role of Christianity in 
promoting the Anglo-European imperialist project’ and warns that ‘one cannot 
overestimate the historical influence of the Christian tradition in disseminat-
ing imperialist ideologies’.4 It is precisely the repeated, perhaps unwitting, dis-
semination of ‘imperialist ideologies’ by scholars of religion and gender that I 
believe lies behind their relative neglect of postcolonial reflection and which 
is my concern in this paper. As Kwok and Donaldson caution, ‘without critical 
attention to colonial representation and epistemic violence, feminist scholar-
ship in religion has the danger of replicating the colonial gaze in the name of 
serving a feminist agenda’.5 Morny Joy has sounded a similar warning in her 
article ‘Postcolonial Reflections: Challenges for Religious Studies’ (2001) regard-
ing the need for scholars in the study of religions to attend to the postcolonial 
nature of their own position and, by way of example, to those women who 
are marked as the field’s objects but who insist on an enunciative position at 
odds with this imposed object status. Joy charts a cogent set of responses to 
this positioning by some postcolonial female scholars, who – against the grain 
of various imperialist, universalist renderings of subjectivity or the ostensibly 
benevolent yet coercive operations of white feminism6 – insist on the specific-
ity of their own complex, mobile subjectivities; these are neither unreflexive 
4 L.E. Donaldson, ‘God, Gold, and Gender’ in L. Donaldson and Kwok P-l. (eds.), 
Postcolonialism, Feminism and Religious Discourse, London and New York: Routledge 
2002, 5.
5 L.E. Donaldson and P-l. Kwok, ‘Introduction’ in Postcolonialism, Feminism and Religious 
Discourse, 2–3.
6 The term ‘white feminism’ is employed as a general term in critical race and black 
feminist theory to refer to the failure of many ethnically white feminists to acknowledge 
their privilege, evidenced in their alignment of misogyny and racism as straightforwardly 
analogous forms of oppression. It is used to unmask the assumptions that direct this 
equation of misogyny and racism as proceeding from, and enabled by white privilege. 
See, for example, H. Carby, ‘White Woman Listen: Black Feminism and the Boundaries of 
Sisterhood’ in The Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham 
(ed.), The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in Seventies Britain, London: Hutchinson 
1982, 212–235; A. Davis, Women, Race, and Class, New York: Random House 1981; bell 
hooks, Ain’t I A Woman: Black Women and Feminism, Boston: South End Press 1981; 
G. Joseph and J. Lewis (eds.), Common Differences: Conflicts in Black and White Feminist 
Perspectives, New York: Anchor Press 1981.
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imitations of the western metropole, nor dialectically constructed antagonisms 
that leave oppressive structurations intact. Instead, as Joy outlines, they are 
learning opportunities extending from the entangled nature of the subject 
as instantiated in interactions between ‘two autonomous human beings’. Joy 
suggests that attention to these enunciations is a precondition for what she 
evocatively names ‘intellectual adequacy in a postcolonial world’.7 The ques-
tion of adequacy is one that bears directly on the nature of the catachresis (as 
postcolonial practice) that I wish to explore below. Moreover, it also speaks to 
the nature of the task that I will suggest is a necessary undertaking – that of 
displacement – in tackling the question of the propriety of aligning the three 
terms ‘religion, gender, and postcoloniality’ inasmuch as they can be assumed to 
be coeval categories sharing a degree of family resemblance.
An overdue question that confronts scholars in the field of religion and gen-
der today is that of the necessity or advantages of thinking ‘religion’, ‘gender’ 
and ‘postcoloniality’ together, and when they are placed in proximity what the 
nature of that placement might be: ontological, epistemological or an amal-
gamation that sees these as always already entangled? In seeking intellectual 
adequacy, do we not need to ask what imperatives demand the assemblage of 
these categories and identifications, or what constraints or ethical obligations 
might require their dispersal and disaffiliation? I have been wondering whose 
categories ‘religion’, ‘gender’, and ‘postcoloniality’ are. Can their ownership be 
traced and what might the implications of identifying such a proprietor be for 
the field of religion and gender? On the one hand each term is operational-
ized in various intellectual contexts – that is, not only within religious studies 
or theology – as an epistemological signifier bearing some relation, however 
heterogeneous, to a concrete material reality such that whole bodies of knowl-
edge are erected on their foundations; on the other hand they are furiously 
contested on the basis of that very heterogeneity which is taken as signifying 
an effective contentlessness or politically suspect and/or staged character. More-
over, they bear ontological capital: they are identity markers in which a variety 
of diverse populations either invest or contest themselves, claim or reject their 
framing. By way of seeing the entangled nature of the ontic and epistemic, the 
case of ‘religion’ can prove instructive. In what follows, I want to outline briefly 
a broadly Asadian understanding of historical operationalization of ‘religion’ 
under the sign of secularism and within colonial knowledge formations in order 
to track the ways in which this particular genealogy continues to play itself out 
in the work of religion and gender scholars when we disregard or domesticate 
postcolonial challenges to the stability or priority of our eponymous foci.
Genealogies of Religion: The Fraternity of Secularism and 
Colonialism
Eduardo Mendieta has suggested that ‘How the West allegedly became secular 
is a story not just about the containment of religion within the West, but also…
7 M. Joy, ‘Postcolonial Reflections: Challenges for Religious Studies’ in Method & 
Theory in the Study of Religions 13:2 (2001), 177–195: 183.
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about what distinguishes the West from the rest’.8 The Enlightenment master 
narrative of reason as both the foundation and the pinnacle of ‘civilization’ 
relied on the notion that reason had conquered or contained religion. ‘Reli-
gion’ insofar as it implied a simultaneously temporal and spatial valuation, thus 
operated as a negative signifier in a series of conceptual dichotomies – public/
private, secular/religious, religion/state – that were fundamental to the self-
understanding of European modernity. For the historian and anthropologist of 
religion Daniel Dubuisson, the category of religion was absolutely fundamental 
for the creation and nourishment of the idea of the Occident as world-historical 
vanguard:
Created by the West, enshrined in Western epistemology, and central to its 
identity, the concept of religion eventually came to be the core of the Western 
worldview. Since this notion is intrinsically linked to all the philosophies, comple-
mentary or competing, that have been invented in the West, the West cannot, 
at the risk of its own disintegration, do without it, because these global concep-
tions would then decompose into scattered or juxtaposed fragments…. Would 
not abandoning the idea of religion be the equivalent for Western thought of 
abdicating part of its intellectual hegemony over the world?9
Modernity, narrativized as the Age of Reason, required a constrastive foil that 
would necessitate and ordain its doctrines of progress and historicism; the west 
could point to its defeat of ‘superstition’ as the means by which it had achieved 
the triumphs of industrialization. By asserting a distance from the atavism, des-
potism, and irrationality religion was taken to represent, the west was, moreover, 
able to distinguish itself philosophically and materially from those non-western 
societies and cultures it set out to subjugate. However, Dubuisson here hints 
not only at the role that conceptions of religion played in securing the west as 
the best so to speak, but also at the religious origins of secular modernity. One 
of the seemingly founding gestures of the Enlightenment, the assertion of the 
human individual as autonomous, rational, and interior, was unthinkable with-
out the splenetic programme of the Protestant Reformation which had initiated 
a slow revolution in which previously unassailable articles of faith, particularly 
the location of the site of truth, were challenged and reconceived. The mediat-
ing authority of the clergy was displaced such that interpretive responsibility 
8 E. Mendieta, ‘Imperial Somatics and Genealogies of Religion: How We Never Became 
Secular’ in P. Bilimoria and A.B. Irvine (eds.) Postcolonial Philosophy of Religion, 
Dordrecht: Springer 2009, 236. While I am citing Mendieta’s work here, I should note 
that the framework and hermeneutic lens he employs is derived from Talal Asad’s 
elegant rendering of the conjoined genealogy of religion and secularism that has proven 
foundational to what I have named elsewhere as the ‘political turn’ (see S. Hawthorne, 
‘An Outlaw Ethics for the Study of Religions: Maternality and the Dialogic Subject in 
Julia Kristeva’s “Stabat Mater”’ in Culture and Dialogue 3:1 (2013), 127–151: 127) in 
the academic field of the study of religions as well of course in the adjacent fields of 
anthropology, sociology, history etc. See particularly T. Asad, Genealogies of Religion 
(cited above) and Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press 2003.
9 D. Dubuisson, The Western Construction of Religion: Myths, Knowledge, and Ideology, 
trans. William Sayers, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press 2003, 
94.
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now lay with the individual and state religion replaced global Catholicism shift-
ing the balance of power towards the nation state. The full implications of the 
principle of an individual’s autonomous judgment in matters of religion were 
slowly to be realised in the Enlightenment elevation of human reason. As the 
centre of gravity shifted from clerical authority to the individual as arbiter of 
salvation, it was simply a matter of time before the emphasis on human auton-
omy in relationship to the divine proceeded to an eventual rejection of the 
foundational veracity of the Christian faith. Religion no longer warranted a 
privileged place in the public sphere; it was stripped of its historical role as arbi-
ter in those public institutions that were to legislate truth and power. The state 
took over the roles of education, healthcare, and welfare that the Church had 
historically played, and religion was subsequently domesticated as a matter for 
the individual’s conscience. This privatization of religion constituted its demo-
tion from having permeated every aspect of life to now being segregated from 
political, economic, and intellectual realms.
It is worth acknowledging the gendered dynamics of this redistribution. Aune 
et al. point to the masculinized character of secular modernity when they note 
that its
core characteristics … – rationalization, separation of church and state, bureau-
cratization, industrialization, capitalism – were mainly driven forward in the pub-
lic arena by men. The division of women and men into ‘separate spheres’, coupled 
with the privatization of religion as it lost its social influence, feminized religion, 
connecting it with women’s activities in the private sphere.10
Scholars in the field of religion and gender have, of course, recognized the 
dangers of such an alignment and have worked within the feminist rubric of 
the ‘personal is political’ to dismantle its logic and to rescue female religiosity 
from the trivialization that its domestication appears to imply. However, resist-
ing the equation of the feminized nature of privatized religion with that which 
is marginal – for example, by insisting that scholars of religion should reform 
the androcentric fiction that idealizes (and idolizes) a normative male religious 
subject and ignores the differential accounts of religiosity that result from the 
purported specificity of non-normative subjects – has risked reinscribing the pri-
ority of the public sphere inasmuch as the demand for the recognition of wom-
en’s religious expression as political practice reinforces the assumption that the 
public arena is the only space wherein civic recognition is possible. It has also, 
as I will elaborate below, presumed a universalizable model of gender config-
ured according to what is in fact the ethnocentrically particular history of post-
Enlightenment politico-philosophical conceptuality marked by preoccupations 
with emancipation, civil rights, and individual agency and autonomy.
With the spatial distillation of religion to the private sphere in the service of 
European secularism, temporality was also redistributed in the western (historicist) 
imaginary and this in turn affected a different redistribution of space: conceived of 
as sequential and inexorable, secularism marked a teleological movement in time 
from primitive reliance on the erroneous reasoning that religion represented to 
the civilized and civilizing present secured by reliable rationality. In the aftermath 
10 K. Aune, S. Sharma, and G. Vincett, (eds.) Women and Religion in the West: Challenging 
Secularization, Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate 2008, 5.
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of the Enlightenment, the use of the term ‘religion’ to classify worldviews at seem-
ing odds with secular modernity indicated an a priori division between supersti-
tion and reason, the past and present, and, most significantly, between ‘us’ and 
‘them’. Thus, the mobilizing narratives of western secularism – the autonomous 
subject, the conquest of religion, and the rise of scientific empiricism as conveyor 
of truth – carried with them what Mendieta refers to as the ‘colonial and imperial 
underside of modernity’.11 ‘Religion’ once more played a pivotal role in orienting 
western ontology, enabling a distinction to be conjured between the enlightened 
nature of European modernity and the ‘religious’ (read: erroneous, primitive, and 
degenerate) worldviews of colonized populations. The constrastive function of 
‘religion’ served in this case as the ground of possibility for the colonial imaginary: 
that of the European duty to civilize.
What is too easily forgotten, and what Talal Asad has done so much to remind 
us, is the extent to which ‘religion’ was an ethnocentric and normative descrip-
tor; the contemporary common-sense notion of religion’s universality obscures 
the history of its production and its subsequent violent inscription on cultural 
practices, traditions, and conceptual schemas quite alien to the specificity of its 
European provenance. The representation of non-western traditions and world-
views as ‘religions’ interpellated them into a highly provincialized debate that 
not only restricted their possible modes of articulation and signification but also 
predetermined their reception and dissemination. Thus to use the term ‘religion’ 
to refer to non-western traditions is to subject them to a conceptual regime 
that always already implies their inferiority whilst at the same time mistakenly 
assuming a shared referentiality, that of the agonistic dichotomization of the 
religious and the secular realms characteristic of post-Enlightenment European 
history. The west’s struggles to overcome religion were struggles to overcome 
Christianity but Christianity was nonetheless the primogenitive model for those 
traditions we now understand as religious. The effect of taking Christianity as 
a prototype of ‘religion’ meant that the parameters for what counts as religion 
were determined on the extent to which a tradition or practice conformed to 
the Christian model wherein belief in a transcendent deity is an essential feature. 
In the context of the colonial imposition of the Christian prototype, it should 
be noted that praxis or kinship networks, rather than creedal belief, were far 
more often the basis for participation in those non-Christian traditions that were 
translated as ‘religious’. Moreover, the modern Cartesian preference for interi-
ority privileged belief as the essence of religiosity, precisely a repetition of the 
Enlightenment privatization of the religious, wherein it is ideally sequestered 
from the public realm of the political: an emphasis on belief stresses the inter-
nal, personal dimensions of a creedal idiom and implies that all other spheres of 
human activity – political, cultural, intellectual or economic – are protected from 
the menacing cognitive modalities that bear the signature of the ‘religious’.12 
Similar to the privileging of belief was the assumption of the centrality of 
a canonical textual tradition as a defining marker of religion. As Richard King 
11 E. Mendieta, ‘Imperial Somatics’, 238.
12 This segregation is doubly problematic because it not only marginalizes and disarms 
the significance of the religious sphere for debates in the public domain which ‘religion’ 
nonetheless structures and originates, it also effectively protects all ‘religious’ traditions 
from public scrutiny and criticism in the marketplace of ideas.
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has argued in the context of the colonial translation of ‘religion’ into the South 
Asian context, 
‘religion’ and the related group of concepts and orientations that cluster around 
it … functioned as prescriptive models or blueprints …. This is no more apparent 
than in the tendency…to locate ‘authentic religiosity’ within the sacred texts of 
a tradition and in the interpretation of prescriptive statements within those texts 
as descriptive accounts of historical truth.13
Here King draws attention to the residual aftermath of the colonial imposition 
of a highly Christianized understanding of religion. Inasmuch as India can serve 
as representative, the translation of a – by now – obscurely Christianized ‘religio’ 
into the rich and layered discursivity of subcontinental Asia reduced it to a crude 
homogeneity which could then be divided into discrete units on the basis of 
presumed differences in doctrine derived from constructed textual traditions – 
Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Jaina, Buddhist etc. – indirectly enabling the colonial policy 
of divide and rule. The various colonial demands for the collation of texts as the 
locus of religiosity – reflecting, it should be noted, the Protestant preference 
for literacy – had the further effect of sanctioning and sacralizing high-caste 
Brahmanical representations of social order and conservative gender valuations. 
Thus the prescriptive character of ‘religion’, its differentiation from secularity as 
embedded within colonial knowledge formations, and its fabrication of distinct 
textual traditions, gave rise to a number of new creations: Hinduism (a term 
coined by the British evangelical Charles Grant who advocated a robust pro-
gramme of Christianization in the 1770s), and ‘Buddhism’ and ‘Taoism’ in the 
1820s.14 Their codification as religions did not describe some pre-existent unity 
but rather signalled a deliberate and inventive act of assemblage of diverse ele-
ments into a seemingly coherent whole on the model of Christianity.15 
However, even if ‘religion’ has been a colonial-cum-scholarly invention, 
what now must be understood is its postcolonial nature: its function after the 
fact as a strategic mechanism for collective identification, and its active task 
of (re)translation within postcolonial frameworks where social categories are 
remade and put to work as acts of resistance, displacement, and creation. Thus, 
in a postcolonial context ‘religion’ may become the sign of hybridity carrying 
with it both the history of its invention and the tactical (mis)appropriation of 
colonial conceptuality. Whilst abandoning the terminology of ‘religion’ might 
satisfy the critique of the colonial invention/imposition of ‘religion’, it would 
inevitably ignore the creative, transformative and resistant nature of postco-
loniality. Homi Bhabha has suggested, for example, a modelling of hybridity as 
resistance to colonial authority by colonized populations through the practice 
of subversive mimicry.16 For Bhabha, anti-colonial ‘resistance’ ‘is not necessarily 
13 R. King, ‘Imagining Religions in India: Colonialism and the Mapping of South Asian 
History and Culture’ in M. Dressler and A. Mandair (eds.), Secularism and Religion-
Making, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press 2011, 37–61: 45.
14 Ibid.
15 For a compelling analysis of the effect of the colonial and neo-colonial translation 
of religion on the Sikh tradition see A-P.S. Mandair, Religion and the Specter of the 
West: Sikhism, India, Postcoloniality, and the Politics of Translation, New York: Columbia 
University Press 2009.
16 H.K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture. London: Routledge 2004, 101, 121–124.
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an oppositional act of political intention, nor…the simple negation or exclu-
sion of the “content” of another culture…. It is the effect of an ambivalence 
produced with the rules of recognition of dominating discourses’.17 Thus, the 
appropriation of ‘religion’ as an identity term whose content is remade as a 
consequence indicates that colonized populations’ resistance to and re-employ-
ment of colonial conceptuality ensured that this conceptuality was also acted 
upon, transformed, and subverted. The ambivalence affected in the central or 
identity term – religion – is exemplified for Bhabha in an early 19th-century mis-
sionary register which reports the encounter of the missionary Anund Messeh 
with an assembly of Indian converts to Christianity near Delhi:
He found about 500 people, men, women and children … in reading and con-
versation. He went up to an elderly looking man … ‘Pray, who are all these peo-
ple?….’ ‘We are poor and lowly, and we read and love this book’…. Anund, on 
opening the book, perceived it to be the Gospel of our Lord, translated into the 
Hindoostanee Tongue…. ‘These books’, said Anund, ‘teach the religion of the 
European Sahibs. It is THEIR book; and they printed it in our language, for our 
use’. ‘Ah! no’, replied the stranger, ‘that cannot be for they eat flesh’…. [Anund] 
explained to them the nature of the Sacrament and of Baptism; in answer to 
which they replied, ‘We are willing to be baptized, but we will never take the 
Sacrament … because the Europeans eat cow’s flesh’.18
Bhabha understands the tale to epitomize a form of native subversion of the 
terms of the colonizing religion; the Indian converts are prepared to adopt 
some aspects of Christianity but are not willing to do so wholesale. As Bhabha 
puts it, ‘in embracing the Christian religion they never entirely renounce their 
superstitions towards which they always keep a secret bent’.19 Thus, the native 
Indian embrace of the Christian faith via hybrid demands, as depicted in this 
case, figures a subversion of Christianity, constituting a form of resistance that 
is more dynamic than a straightforward repudiation or negation because it is in 
the gestures of hybridity and mimicry that the colonizing idiom is reworked and 
transformed. Christianity is, as a consequence, particularized and subordinated 
to a local idiom. The hybridity that characterizes this case achieves the displace-
ment of the Gospel, ‘the English book’, and with it, the colonial claim to univer-
sality. As Bhabha suggests, ‘If the appearance of the English book is read as a 
production of colonial hybridity, then it no longer simply commands authority. 
It gives rise [instead] to a series of questions of authority’.20 The subterranean 
theme of resistant displacement that these forms of colonized appropriation 
appear to cite is one to which I will return below, particularly in order to assess 
the extent to which, as strategic responses to the oppressive weight of colonial 
conceptuality, they are successful. However, I first want to examine the ways in 
which the academic field of religion and gender (within, although not entirely 
restricted to, religious studies) in its insistence on the universality of ‘gender’, 
might unwittingly, reproduce the colonial dynamic directing the secularist valu-
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The Value-Coding of Religion and Gender
Religion and gender as a distinct field of study within religious studies21 has been 
staged as a critical intervention against the exclusion of gender as an analytic cat-
21 I want here to clarify, finally, and probably rather too belatedly, what I am framing in 
this paper as the ‘field of religion and gender’ given that it has for me a specificity that 
can be – and has been – contested in respect of whether that scholarship which might be 
broadly read as concerned with the themes of religion and gender in a multidisciplinary 
context should be subject to the critique I am pursuing. I would firstly acknowledge that 
as a scholar who has trained in two interdisciplinary fields (Religious Studies and Gender 
Studies), I understand well that drawing disciplinary boundaries is a fraught, unfortunate, 
but often institutionally necessary and practical business. I do not primarily mean ‘field’, 
therefore, in the more general sense of a kind of multidisciplinary cluster of scholarship 
focused on the broad themes of religion and gender as conducted as a specialist focus 
in disciplines such as anthropology or sociology beyond the field of religious studies. 
The different genealogies and priorities of these fields and the types of intellectual 
contestations and geo-political demands that have produced their research agendas have 
often meant that ‘religion and gender’ scholarship therein has tended, in the main, to 
be fairly well attuned to the substance and detail of postcolonial critique, producing as 
a consequence often very nuanced and carefully rendered representations that largely, 
although not entirely, avoid the problematic I am calling attention to in this paper. I 
have in mind here, as a particular and most obvious example, the contemporary vigorous 
debates in multidisciplinary scholarship on Islam, modernity, gender, and secularism that 
have grown apace since the beginning of this century. I intend my remarks in this paper, 
rather, to be mainly, though not solely, directed towards my own field within religious 
studies, one that has laboured since the mid-1960s to carve out a space for considerations 
of religion and gender informed by the feminist ethos of description and prescription 
that emerged out of second-wave feminist political practice and which has been directed 
at reforming both a variety of confessional traditions and the institutionalised, academic 
study of religions. I have charted the genealogy of this field elsewhere (see S. Hawthorne 
‘Religion and Gender: Contentious Traditions’ in P. Clarke, ed. The Oxford Handbook of 
the Sociology of Religion, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press 2008, 134–151; 
‘Religion and Gender’ in F. Malti-Douglas, et al. eds. Encyclopedia of Sex and Gender, 
Farrington Hills, MI: Macmillan Reference, Thompson Gale 2007; ‘Feminism: Feminism, 
Gender Studies, and Religion’ and ’Gender & Religion: History of Study’ in L. Jones, et al. 
eds. Encyclopedia of Religions, Second Edition, vols. 3/5. Farrington Hills, MI: Thomson 
Gale 2005, 3023–3027; 3310–3318) and would argue that it has been in fact the scholars 
in this field who have done the most to establish the study of religion and gender as a 
legitimate, important, and distinctive academic field (framed in terms of curricula, degree 
programmes, research centres, publication and conference foci, etc.), indeed to the extent 
that some of the work in disciplines outside the study of religion have often ended up 
reinventing the wheels turned by feminist scholars in religious studies and theology some 
decades ago. However, for all the pioneering and inspiring work that has been conducted 
in this field, it remains my view that there has been a regrettable dearth of postcolonial 
reflection as a mainstream activity in the field inasmuch as the basic premises, assumptions, 
and trajectories derived from the field’s feminist origins have not been subjected to 
anything approaching a systematic, collective, and fully reflexive assessment wherein the 
epistemological and ontological implications of postcolonial critique are taken seriously. 
That said, I would also maintain in more general terms that any scholarship identifying 
itself as invested in the categories of religion and gender that fails to assess its working 
assumptions in response to the demands of postcoloniality is also a target of critique in this 
paper.
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egory within the broader interdisciplinary study of religions. Emerging from the 
pioneering work of feminist scholarship in theology, it has tended to share and 
replicate feminist commitments to retrieving women’s voices as well as to exam-
ining critically men’s voices as specifically gendered and heterogeneous, and to 
work for the reform of the conceptual domains that reproduce various forms of 
gendered (and indeed sexual) exclusions. Having noticed the relative silence that 
seems to attend the aggregation of ‘religion’, ‘gender’, and ‘postcoloniality’ – as 
though their affiliation is so obvious as to pass without remark such that it liter-
ally passes without remark – I began to wonder if this was a sign, inherited from 
the historical feminist framing of the field, of a complacent assumption that all 
marginalities share a family resemblance such that experiences of exclusion along 
the intersectional spectrum of gender, sexuality, race, class, and all the other ‘oth-
ers’, are traded as so many badges of honour. It seems that the symptoms of this 
complacency can be tracked through a variety of practices, only two of which 
I will address here, but both of which replicate what I believe can be read as a 
colonialist dynamic: (1) the tendency to employ an ethnocentric model of gen-
der masquerading as universal but in fact informed predominantly by western 
feminist assumptions and political agendas which have selectively appropriated 
non-western traditions and models in their service; (2) a propensity to conflate 
feminist and postcolonial interests and experiences as similar if not the same.
A notable example (by virtue of its influence and prevalence in ‘religion and 
gender’ curricula in religious studies) in respect of the first practice is the work 
of the self-identified feminist Buddhist theologian, Rita Gross who claims that 
her work constitutes a ‘feminist revalorization of Buddhism’.22 In Buddhism After 
Patriarchy: A Feminist History, Analysis, and Reconstruction of Buddhism (1993), 
Gross seeks to show how a reconstructed authentic core of Buddhism reflects and 
supports feminist values, insofar as it ‘is without gender bias, whatever the prac-
tical record may reveal, and that sexist practices are in actual contradiction with 
the essential core teachings of the tradition’.23 She extrapolates from this to sug-
gest that many religions may have originally possessed an egalitarian, non-sexist 
central vision uncontaminated by later patriarchal distortions. Gross’s work has 
attracted strong criticism from some feminists, most particularly Marsha Hewitt 
who has argued that the major problem with Gross’s reconstructive efforts – and 
22 R.M. Gross, Buddhism After Patriarchy: A Feminist History, Analysis, and Reconstruction 
of Buddhism, Albany, NY: SUNY Press 1993, 305. I do not intend here to single out Gross 
as an exemplary or exceptional offender (I would certainly, for example, include my own 
work as guilty of the practices I am identifying as problematic in this paper), but rather to 
draw attention to a general tendency in even the best and most pioneering religion and 
gender scholarship in the field to reproduce a colonialist dynamic whilst being seemingly 
alert to the dangers of doing so. Thus, elsewhere Gross has stated that ‘since no one can 
speak for all perspectives, every position, every scholar will overlook or underemphasize 
something vital …. The question is not whether a scholar has included every possible 
perspective, but whether she speaks authentically and non imperialistically from her 
own standpoint’ (R.M. Gross, Feminism and Religion, Boston: Beacon Press 1996, 51). 
It is precisely this issue of one’s ‘own standpoint’ that I think needs to be better, more 
thoroughly excavated as a collective enterprise for those of us committed to identifying 
ourselves as scholars in the field of religion and gender and who simultaneously attribute 
the motivation and ethics of our work to be embedded in feminist theory and practice.
23 Ibid., 210; my emphasis.
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indeed for feminist revisionist histories in general – are that she establishes herself 
as the arbiter of the Buddhist tradition, imposing on an alien context a historically 
specific, ethnocentric, and ideological vision of appropriate religiosity informed 
by liberal feminist values. What Gross does therefore is endorse the universality 
of feminist insights against evidence to the contrary (‘the practical record’). Her 
attempts to transform Buddhism into a set of ideas palatable to modern western 
feminist philosophy instead subjects Buddhism to what Hewitt calls ‘ideological 
colonization’ insofar as the determination of what constitutes the irreducible 
feminist core of the religion ‘is decided in terms of the primacy of feminism, not 
tradition’.24 Gross suggests moreover, in contradiction to her claim that early 
 Buddhism contained the elements of a feminist sensibility, that a revalorized 
Buddhism will in fact be achieved, not by mining its egalitarian past for resources 
but by learning from the prophetic traditions of Christianity and Judaism with 
which she sees Christian feminist theology ‘in direct continuity’.25 Thus Gross 
appears to replicate the universalist impulse of colonialist conceptual regimes 
that promoted Christianity as the progenitor model of religio and demanded 
conformity to its imperatives and structurations, in order to elevate feminism as a 
soteriological model unconstrained by temporal or spatial specificity. Operational 
here, is an assumption of the fundamental sameness of women in time and space 
as they are forced into a negotiation with patriarchal structures.
Of course, there are many good reasons for elevating feminist insights above 
those that are inimical to women’s interests but this cannot be done by playing 
fast and loose with the historical record or indeed with women’s and men’s own 
accounts of themselves and their relations to their traditions. To impose feminist 
values retrospectively on material wholly different historically, philosophically, 
or geographically is to indulge in a form of discursive imperialism that weak-
ens the intellectual credibility and political force of feminist and gender-critical 
work. Thus the response to the difficulties posed by Gross’ work and by scholar-
ship in religion and gender that replicates this colonialist dynamic cannot be 
to seek an alternative to the kind of project she pursues but rather to ask the 
necessary question of whether such a practice should be undertaken at all. Saba 
Mahmood has certainly urged caution regarding the certainty of those feminist 
political commitments that proceed from secular valuations of religion ‘when 
trying to understand the lives of others who do not necessarily share these com-
mitments….’. For Mahmood, ‘[W]e can no longer arrogantly assume that secular 
forms of life and secularism's progressive formulations necessarily exhaust ways 
of living meaningfully and richly in this world.26 Mahmood’s point echoes Gay-
atri Spivak’s assessment of a broader problem for white Anglophone feminism 
which glosses a significant problem when it attempts to include a recognition 
of ‘postcolonial marginality’ in the articulation of its mission: ‘that a concern 
with women and men who have not written in the same cultural inscription … 
cannot be mobilized in the same way as the investigation of gendering in one’s 
24 M.A. Hewitt, ‘Ideology Critique, Feminism, and the Study of Religion’ in Method and 
Theory in the Study of Religion 11 (1999), 47–63: 57, 58.
25 R.M. Gross, Buddhism After Patriarchy, 134.
26 S. Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2005, xi–xii.
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own’.27 The lesson here is that the conceptual terrain – the categories, histories, 
methods, and assumptions – of Anglophone feminism is so ethnocentrically spe-
cific that its extension beyond that specificity to co-opt the values and histories 
of others in the service of its own project should be approached very warily if at 
all. Demands for women’s autonomy and recognition of their religious agency 
have animated much scholarship in the field of religion and gender insofar it 
has proceeded from a feminist sensibility and have certainly proven politically 
transformative in the western academy. However, we should note Mahmood’s 
warning against the scholarly co-optation of women’s agency in support of ‘the 
goals of progressive politics’ because it obscures those ‘dimensions of human 
action whose ethical and political status does not map onto the logic of repres-
sion and resistance’.28 But where in the work of scholars of religion and gender 
do we find an account of those subjects who resist the conceptual schemas in 
which we place them, that is, where their resistance and autonomy is not in the 
end reinscribed within a hermeneutic that reads their agentive practices within a 
binary logic of either subversion of, or collusion with patriarchal norms?29 Where 
is an acknowledgement of the autonomous domain in which they articulate a 
conceptuality wholly, or even partially, different to the academic and western 
construction of their worlds and values? As Mahmood quite rightly argues,
If we recognize that the desire for freedom from, or subversion of, norms is not an 
innate desire that motivates all beings at all times, but is also profoundly mediated 
by cultural and historical conditions, then the question arises: how do we analyze 
operations of power that construct different kinds of bodies, knowledges, and sub-
jectivities whose trajectories do not follow the entelechy of liberatory politics?30
27 G. Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the 
Vanishing Present, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1999, 170.
28 Mahmood, Politics of Piety, 14.
29 For a detailed and elegant elaboration of this point see S. Langsdale, Damaged Bodies: 
Women’s Agency in Trecento Florentine Soteriological Discourses, PhD SOAS, University 
of London 2013, especially Chapters 1 and 6.
30 Ibid. Mahmood’s broader project, at least as developed in The Politics of Piety, is 
nonetheless problematic. Even though she articulates extremely well what is in fact 
one of Talal Asad’s key arguments – that the ‘religious’ and the ‘secular’ are mutually 
constitutive and entangled – Mahmood is unable to avoid the rather pedestrian 
temptation to represent pious Egyptian Salafi women as paradigmatic embodiments of 
‘radical alterity’. She does so in ways that I think end up simplifying a more complex 
locutionary encounter, tending to contrast too starkly Salafi women’s praxis and 
milieu to a fairly homogenised western liberal subject. As a consequence she ends 
up ideologizing the lives both of the Salafi women in Cairo and of western feminists 
(in particular) such that they both emerge as ultimately contentless political ciphers, 
with the Egyptian women read reductively as signifiers of postcoloniality and distilled 
religiosity uncontaminated by globalizing secularism. Another related aspect to this 
latter point that is equally problematic is Mahmood’s conflation of secularism with the 
western liberal philosophical tradition which presents an impoverished conception of 
secularity, one that stands in sharp contrast to those of scholars such as Ruth Mas, Dipesh 
Chakrabarty, Arvind Mandair, William Connolly, Ananda Abeysekara, Akheel Bilgrami, 
and Amartya Sen, amongst others. Thus, while I agree with the general argument that 
Mahmood makes regarding the generally parochial nature of western (liberal) feminist 
theorizations of gender (and indeed of religion), I do not believe that she herself presents 
an account that escapes the dangers of ideological reading that she calls attention to.
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We should recognise here that in the genealogy of ‘gender’ as a category of 
analysis its contours were sketched and then embellished in a manner closely 
allied to western, liberal feminist trajectories of liberation. We must therefore 
ask the many ways in which gender might be constructed apart from the par-
ticularity of its history in the west.
Mahmood’s argument here connects to the second practice that I have sug-
gested is problematic within the field of religion and gender: the conflation 
of women’s experiences of oppression with all other forms of marginality. 
Could it be that as scholars of religion and gender, whose professional lives 
are oriented around the preservation and intricate patrolling of that territory 
we have laboured to mark out as a place safe from the intrusions of andro-
centric chauvinism, we presumed we were sufficiently cognisant of the opera-
tions of power in the means and forms of exclusion that there was little more 
to be said when it came to integrating postcolonial perspectives? Is this why 
the ‘postcolonial’ – as though it can even be spoken in the singular – passes 
without saying or if it is said then it is domesticated with all the other ‘oth-
ers’? Generally speaking feminist scholarship in the field of religious studies 
has tended to suggest such a coalition. Margaret Suchocki, for example, has 
posited an equivalence between the colonialist practice of religion making in 
the image of Christianity and androcentrism, suggesting that ‘Absolutizing one 
religion such that it becomes normative for all others is a dynamic with clear 
parallels to sexism, whereby one gender is established as the norm for human 
existence. Therefore the critique of gender can be extended as a critique of 
religious imperialism’.31 Similarly, Morny Joy has argued that ‘the process of 
“othering” that has been inflicted by dominant Western values is similar to 
the way women…have been judged and found wanting according to prevail-
ing standards of masculinity and/or rationality’.32 However, the metaphorical 
extension of concepts related to the historical fact of European colonization in 
order to amplify the alterity and exploitation of women (in particular) employs 
a series of problematic assumptions – not least that all European colonialism 
operated in the same way and towards the same ends – which result not only 
in the elision of the specificity of the European colonial period but suggest that 
all women share a similar experience of oppression assessed predominantly in 
the terms prescribed by Anglo-American feminism which assumes ‘gender’ to 
be a priori the site of intersection.33
What has made it possible for scholars in the field of religion and gender to 
see postcoloniality as just another marginality amongst others rather than see it 
31 M.H. Suchocki, ‘In search of justice’ in J. Hick and P.F. Knitter (eds.), The Myth of 
Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
1989, 150.
32 Joy, ‘Postcolonial Reflections’, 178.
33 See C.T. Mohanty, ‘Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial discourses’ 
in C.T. Mohanty, A. Russo, and L. Torres (eds.), Third World Women and the Politics of 
Feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1991, 52. I do not mean to suggest here 
that Joy herself (con)fuses the position of women with that of the colonized subject – 
she in fact takes pains to listen to those postcolonial voices which challenge the feminist 
appropriation of the experiences of non-western women – but rather to draw attention 
to the broader tendency in some feminist scholarship to ignore the specificity of the 
colonial era in order to draw on its rhetorical power.
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as perhaps the place from which theorizing ‘our’ reconfigurations of centre and 
periphery – to whom this ‘our’ might refer must be named (how do we ensure 
that ‘our’ becomes more attuned to its own differences?) – must be rethought 
and perhaps even overturned? Part of the answer lies, I think, in our failure to 
attend to the ethnocentrism of the field’s history such that ‘gender’ becomes 
prioritized as the site of origination for critique (because it is assumed to be the 
site of origination for the self) rather than the historical facticity of colonialisms 
and their afterlives. Thus ‘gender’ as both an ontic category – inasmuch as it is 
claimed as the place of enunciation – and an epistemic one – to the extent that 
it provides the content and analytic framing for that enunciation – appears to 
be unimplicated in colonial value codings. However, the creation and valuation 
of ‘religion’ as a discursive entity, as I traced above, was carefully calibrated to 
a curiously European construction of gendered difference, wherein ‘religion’ 
and ‘female’ were semantically clustered and devalued under the fraternity of 
modernity and the colonial fantasy of the civilizing mission.34 These colonial 
histories have formed the present, for all of us, however differentiated our 
relations to those histories might be and it thus remains the place from which 
the necessity of triangulating what Kwok and Donaldson name as the ‘critical 
trilogy’35 of religion, gender, postcoloniality must be tested. The Indian feminist 
Uma Narayan, addressing the agonistic encounters between western and non-
western feminists, has argued that
Colonial history is the terrain where the project of ‘Western’ culture’s self-defi-
nition became a project heavily dependent upon its ‘difference’ from its ‘Others’ 
both internal and external. The contemporary self-definitions of many Third-
World cultures and communities are also in profound ways political responses to 
this history. Working together to develop a rich feminist account of this history 
that divides and connects us might well provide Western and Third-World femi-
nists [with] some difficult but interesting common ground, and be a project that 
is crucial and central to any truly ‘international’ feminist politics.36
Narayan here implies that ‘western’ efforts of self-definition are also there-
fore profoundly ‘political responses to this history’. Might we not then read 
the prioritization of gender within the field of religion and gender as precisely 
embedded in a neo-imperialist politics that of necessity invokes a temporally 
and spatial differential – hierarchical – relation to a series of Others that is (mis)
represented as lined up with just so many forms of marginality, where gender 
is nonetheless a first amongst equals? Is this not a collusion with the infernal 
machine that insists on, indeed requires, the homogeneity of the periphery? As 
Sangeeta Ray has suggested regarding the exclusionary practices of white femi-
nists, ‘it is almost as though the very heterogeneity of women in the west needs 
34 For two well-known analyses of the tensions between the different priorities of race and 
gender within colonialist discourse and the advantages accrued to white women under 
colonial rule via the construction of racial alterity see R. Lewis, Gendering Orientalism: 
Race, Femininity, and Representation, London: Routledge 1996; M. Yegenoglu, Colonial 
Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1998.
35 Donaldson and Kwok, Postcolonialism, Feminism and Religious Discourse, 1.
36 U. Narayan, Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions and Third World Feminism, 
London and New York: Routledge 1997.
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to be shored up by anchoring that heterogeneity in the homogeneity of the 
other’.37 Thus, when we fail to account for and to the colonial history that is the 
place of common ground, are we not indulging in a project of self-definition 
that repeats the colonial appropriation of the other in order to accrue social 
and intellectual capital? I mean these questions as a provocation. I know that 
there is good, nuanced, careful work both within the field and in the broader 
multidisciplinary domain of religion and gender scholarship beyond the bounds 
of religious studies. But I still wonder why it is that we did not start from the 
place of the other with whom we casually assert political and intellectual alli-
ances, from the ‘history that divides and connects us’.
The Catachrestic Demands of Postcoloniality
It has been with these questions in mind and directed to my own treacher-
ous itineraries, collusions and dissimulations, that I have looked for a frame in 
which the questions of adequacy, propriety (noting the relation of this term 
to ownership), agency, and ethics, and also of semantics, surrounding the rela-
tionship between ‘religion’, ‘gender’ and ‘postcoloniality’ might be theorized 
and put to work. As a relatively faithful reader of Jacques Derrida and via 
him of Gayatri Spivak, it was not long before their mediations on the lexical 
utility of ‘catachresis’ suggested that this might take the field of religion and 
gender some way to, at the very least, beginning the work of displacement 
that postcolonial thought demands as I have suggested in the Introduction to 
this Special Issue. In Derrida’s formulation,38 a catachresis is an opportunity to 
reconfigure a sign’s relationship to its own ‘proper’ (that is, normative) sense 
through an ‘improper’ use (whether deliberate or not). Spivak seizes on this 
implication to represent catachresis as an agentive and necessary act of ‘revers-
ing, displacing, and seizing the apparatus of value-coding’,39 a definition that 
extends with political intent the Derridean formulation of catachresis as indi-
cating the original and indeed originary incompleteness that is inherent in all 
systems of meaning. For Spivak, catachresis signals a necessary category crisis 
because of a sign’s inadequacy (for example, the erroneous assumption of a 
term’s universality) and the possibility, therefore, of a space in which to articu-
late difference because inasmuch as a category is a catachresis, it is the misuse 
of a proper noun whose referent is inadequately framed, an abstraction that 
covers over the spectral quality of the material referent: catachreses are ‘mas-
ter’ or ‘code’ words that are without literal referents, for example, ‘woman’, 
‘the masses’, ‘Third World’, ‘West’, and, I would add, ‘religion’.40 The nature of 
this inadequacy, of catachresis as the mistaken application of a proper noun 
37 S. Ray, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: In Other Words, Malden MA and Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell 2009, 116.
38 J. Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass, Brighton: Harvester Press 1982, 
255–256.
39 G. Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Poststructuralism, Marginality, Postcoloniality and Value’ in 
P. Collier and H. Geyer-Ryan (eds.), Literary Theory Today, London: Polity Press 1990, 228.
40 G. Chakravorty Spivak, Outside in the Teaching Machine. New York: Routledge 1993, 
139.
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can function in (at least) two directions: (1) as an imposition of a homogenised 
identity on a configuration of difference – for example western normative con-
ceptions of ‘woman’ on the totality of female kind – catachresis is a practice of 
misuse and abstraction; (2) as a repudiation of this imposition and a ‘seizing 
of the apparatus of value-coding’ such that the category in question is used to 
apply to a referent not intended by the original sign, catachresis is a practice 
of abuse that reveals the originary use to be diminished or inadequate – an 
example here would be a claim that a non-western conception of subaltern 
femininity is, in fact, normative. Peter Hitchcock names such a practice as ‘the 
Caliban clause in English’ suggesting that the ‘abrogation of the race- and 
class-bound hierarchies of appropriate language use’ signal ‘the weak spot in 
cultural hegemony where language is appropriated for ends not altogether 
English as posited norm’.41
The destabilizing function of catachresis might appear here to replicate the 
implications of Bhabha’s formulation of hybridity and native mimicry of colonial 
idioms as a resistant move I discussed earlier. According to Bhabha, what appears 
to be the subjection of the colonized to colonial conceptuality – the apparent 
acquiescence of the Indians to the Christian scripture – is in fact shown to be a 
form of subversion and semblance that begins to reverse the ‘identity term’ – 
the Indians’ assertion of their own traditions as the hermeneutic through which 
the alien tradition will be evaluated, incorporated, or discarded. Inasmuch as 
mimetic hybridity is undertaken from the position of the subjugated, it would 
appear to correspond to the Hegelian master/slave dialectic of the indepen-
dent and dependent consciousness: ‘bondage will, when completed, pass into 
the opposite of what it immediately is … and change round into real and true 
independence’.42 Thus the subjugated, dependent consciousness, as the site from 
which the recognition of mastery is yielded, simultaneously traduces the inde-
pendent consciousness by distilling mastery to a dependence on the acknowl-
edgement of that mastery from a mere dependent consciousness. When figured 
as a dialectic between colonizer and colonized, the hybridity that results, accord-
ing to Bhabha, appears to function in two ways: (1) as a disruption or destabiliza-
tion of binary conventions of signification that operate according to a logic of 
identity and difference, origination and supplementation, etc.; and (2) as an act 
of subversion and overturning, hybridity may defamiliarize the familiar in each 
of the various sites of identity inhabited and to particularize that which masquer-
ades as universal. As such hybridity might appear to have much to recommend to 
us in our coming to terms. Hybridity constitutes a form of resistance that is argu-
ably more forceful than dialectic negation; the mimetic processes that precede 
it do exercise some control over meaning and are thus quite effective subver-
sions of authority. Empowered through the power of mimicry, the colonized is 
capable of reversing to some degree, colonial subjugation. What must be noted, 
however, is the extent to which mimicry remains a gesture of secondariness. It 
comes after the fact of discursive imposition insofar as that imposition provides 
the material surface for the enactment of subversion. The framework in which 
41 P. Hitchcock, ‘Decolonizing (the) English’ in South Atlantic Quarterly 100:3, 749–771: 
761.
42 G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind [Phänomenologie des Geistes, 1807], trans. 
J.B. Baillie, New York: Harper & Row 1967, 237 (§ 193).
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the colonized/colonizer dialectic operates remains potentially, therefore, one of 
containment.
In its interest in abuse and impropriety, of thinking terms outside of and 
against themselves, it seems to me that ‘catachresis’ as theorized by Spivak takes 
us further than Bhabha’s mimetic hybridity can. Insofar as she defines it as a 
‘“wholesome” abuse of a figurative move’ she suggests a place of critique not 
absorbed by a master/slave dialectic. Spivak moves us on to seeing the value-
coding of catachresis as an exploitation or perversion of mimicry from a position 
that transgresses the dialectic rather than being immersed in it. It is thus more 
deliberative than mimicry.43 Catachresis as postcolonial practice might therefore 
signify a possible way out from the poignancy that characterizes the postcolo-
nial intellectual seeking to articulate the voice of the oppressed through tropes 
structurally linked to the oppressor without disrupting the dialectic that hybrid-
ity and mimicry run the risk of reifying. Andrzej Warminski’s formulation affirms 
this view of catachresis as a deconstructive labour of force that traverses the 
boundaries of tropological discourse to trouble them, to prise them open:
As the abuse of all tropes, catachresis threatens to open up the tropological sys-
tem and keep it from constituting itself, closing itself off, as a system. That is, as 
a nontrope, catachresis is outside the system of tropes, but as an always possible 
‘outside’ – there will always be at least as many forced uses or abuses of trope as 
there are tropes that we can classify – it has nevertheless to be accounted for in 
terms of that system; it is also ‘inside’ it.44
As such, catachresis as a mode of postcoloniality forms a conscious displacement 
that is not merely a reorganisation or appropriation of the purported norma-
tive system; it moves the site of articulation and refuses to cooperate with or 
to acknowledge the propriety of normative enunciations. It appropriates the 
metaphors of the oppressor and yet ‘abuses’ them through interventions that 
exceed the order of the oppressor. I believe that the conceptual richness of the 
catachresis – the disappearance of semantic stability from the sign, whether 
‘religion’ or ‘gender’, and their displacement to conceptual terrain of an ‘other 
place’ – begins to gesture towards the possibility of making non-Eurocentric, 
intimately local judgments that avoid the necessity of submitting to the impe-
rialist Western rationality and epistemology that insists on its own specificity as 
in fact universal. Indeed an alertness to the catachrestic demands of category 
displacement that mark postcolonial interventions in our field might promise 
a new conceptuality, where we might begin to pay more than lip-service to 
the important differences in priorities, sites of origination and critique, and 
conceptual heterogeneity that mark the categories of ‘religion’ and ‘gender’. 
The scholarly work to expose the political genealogy of ‘religion’ has been 
consequent on a long history of postcolonial challenge, and this work must be 
more adequately and determinedly extended to the epistemological history 
of ‘gender’ in our field. Where scholars of religion have recognised religion’s 
embeddedness in a parochial struggle between the rival regimes of truth of 
church and state, and the conceptual limitations that result from its colonialist 
43 Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, 14.
44 A. Warminski, Readings in Interpretation, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 
1987, liv.
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plotting according to a Christianized prototype, scholars of religion and gen-
der must do more to seek out those models of gender that operate beyond, 
against, or without reference to the western metropole, those that do not 
simply repeat the tired negotiation of the dualist demands of the public and 
private spheres aligned so constrictively to the self-understanding of the secu-
lar state and its occulted dependence on religious conceptions, or acquiesce 
with a simplistic choice between emancipation and oppression according to 
the mores of liberalism. Learning from the catachrestic abuse of gender-critical 
conceptuality that is the mark of postcolonial resistance and creation – instanti-
ated by the examples offered in the other articles in this special issue – is one 
way of breaking the cycle of self-absorption and colonialist appropriation that 
I have identified in this essay.
With catachresis as a focus for the triadic formulation of ‘religion’, ‘gen-
der’ and ‘postcoloniality’ some ground may be cleared, providing a space for 
reflection on the variety of naming and conceptualizing mechanisms, the forg-
ing of connections, the imposition of systems of intellectual prescription, and 
the histories of struggle that have been wielded, challenged and refused with 
the field of religion and gender. I suspect that each of these three concepts is 
potentially catachrestic insofar as if they must be aligned then it should be in 
the service of indicating and abusing the relationship between categorization 
and value coding that has restricted their operation to the preoccupations and 
priorities of the western world. Thus, we should ask what the terms ‘religion’, 
‘gender’ and ‘postcoloniality’ might disclose about their own and their respec-
tive incompleteness and thus openness when Europe is ‘provincialized’,45 that 
is, when the specificity of western conceptuality is taken as read and displaced 
as central or universal. Could it be that gender will no longer be the site where 
all the usual intersections ‘intersect’? Perhaps it will not remain the site of 
origination for critique once the necessary work of displacement that is the 
mark of catachresis has been worked through. Is the neglect, by scholars of reli-
gion and gender, of the displacements promised by postcoloniality as it works 
on the value-codings of religion and gender – those that precisely challenge 
western formulations of female agency, for example, as potentially imperialist 
interpellations a sign of their incompatibility or possible emptiness as intellec-
tual constructs – indeed, as lived realities – or of a troubling lacuna in the field? 
What impropriety is promised by the conjunction of these three concepts and 
which boundaries might their coalition transgress or reify? I think that living 
for a while with these questions and framings may be one way for the field 
of religion and gender to start the move towards intellectual adequacy in a 
postcolonial world. 
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